Businesses and investors place “bets” or “investments” based on their business acumen and their assessment and views of factors and trends on market demand and supply available at a certain point in time.
How would you feel if you have invested $9b as promised and subsequently certain critical parameters were changed and now adversely affect its viability?
We see land tenders being awarded to the highest bidders and retail investors buying residential and commercial properties but consumed by cooling measures and additional stamp duties being applied across the board thereafter.
What are the PURE market risks that investors are supposed to stomach? Could the investors anticipate and react to man-made risks created in the offices of civil servants?
In the letter to Business Times about Hyflux, reader Leong Mun Wai suggested Hyflux’s financial problems were caused by “an unexpected domestic policy change”.
There were also many things said at the Speakers’ Corner about govt having played a part in contributing to the state of the energy market in Singapore, the collapse of Hyflux and losses suffered by many of its creditors.
I personally would like to hear more from the govt on the state of energy market and from “someone” to chronologically outline key events leading up to that critical moment when directors of Hyflux made the decision on the billion-dollar investment in an integrated-water-treatment-cum-power-plant. EMA tried to explain in this article “Hyflux’s woes due to its own decisions, says EMA” on ST Apr 3, 2019 and “Hyflux’s financial woes ‘a result of its own commercial decisions’, says EMA” on St 2 April 2019.
Or is it developing into a situation of going to Court and everybody just tightens their lips?
Perhaps we have to wait a few years after the incident has been “declassified” for a MBA study report entitled “Is Hyflux a PURE commercial failure?” to be published.
P/S – I am not an investor of Hyflux’s bonds.